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Abstract
Private independent limited partnership venture capital funds receive capital from institutional
investors, without tax incentives. Limited partnership investment activities are governed by restrictive
covenants that are determined by negotiated contract between the fund managers (general partners)
and the institutional investors (limited partners). By contrast, Canadian Labour Sponsored Venture
Capital Corporations (LSVCCs) receive capital only from individual investors who receive tax breaks
on capital contributions of up to CAN$5,000. LSVCC investment activities are governed by statutory
restrictions. This chapter contrasts the governance of LSVCCs to limited partnerships. We also
summarize Canadian evidence on the impact of LSVCC governance and tax incentives: (1) on the
distribution of venture capital funding between private and LSVCC funds; (2) on the unusually large
overhang of uninvested capital in the Canadian venture capital industry; (3) the portfolio size (i.e.
number of investee firms per fund) of private funds versus LSVCCs; and (4) the performance of
LSVCCs relative to other types of venture capital organiziations and other comparable investments for
individual investors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
  Venture capital investing has attracted much governmental interest in the past decade owing to the 
importance of venture capital in funding small technology firms, and the perceived importance of these 
firms to economic growth.  Many governments have in fact launched initiatives designed to strengthen their 
domestic venture capital industries and thus give a boost to their high technology sectors.  This chapter 
examines one such initiative – the Canadian Labour Sponsored Venture Capital Corporation (LSVCC), with 
a view to determining whether the tax expenditures that underlie the LSVCCs are well spent. 
 
  First conceived in the province of Quebec in the early 1980’s, the LSVCC concept spread to most 
of the other provinces in the early 1990’s.  The basic structure of the LSVCC is as follows.  A labour union 
must agree to act as the fund sponsor.  The fund may then be formed as a corporate entity in any province 
with legislation allowing for the creation of an LSVCC, or pursuant to similar federal legislation (although 
the fund may then operate only in provinces specifically permitting federal funds to carry on business).  The 
labour union, however, will have ownership interest in the fund; it will typically hold a class of shares that 
are not entitled to receive either dividends or any portion of assets on winding up.  It will agree to act as 
sponsor in return for the payment of either a fixed fee or some percentage of the fund’s assets under 
administration.  Despite the absence of an ownership interest, however, the union is statutorily required to 
appoint a majority of the fund’s board of directors, giving it de jure control of the fund.  As a practical 
matter, however, the fund will be run by a team of managers and advisors who are contractually engaged by 
the fund to supply management services (in some cases, augmented by a team of in-house managers and 
advisors).  Indeed, in many cases, the initiative to form the fund will originate with the management 
company, rather than the labour union. 
   
  Only individuals may invest in LSVCCs.  Because a primary motivation for making an investment 
is the generous tax benefits that attach to an LSVCC investment, most contributions are made in the three 
months preceding the end of any given tax year. 
 
  The LSVCC is thus a hybrid between a traditional mutual fund and a venture capital fund, although 
there are material differences from each.  While a traditional mutual fund invests primarily in the securities 
of publicly traded corporations, an LSVCC is constrained by its incorporating legislation to invest primarily 
in small and medium-sized private corporations.  And while a traditional venture capital partnership invests 
in similar types of small and medium-sized enterprises, it will be capitalized by a combination of   2 
 
                                                
institutional investors, corporations, and wealthy individuals.  Moreover, it will be organized as a limited 
partnership, with the management company assuming the role of general partner. 
 
Because ownership and control achieve perfect separation in the LSVCC, it would appear to be a 
structure that is destined to generate significant agency costs, and therefore poor returns.  In this chapter, 
we summarize previous and current research dealing with Canadian LSVCCs.  This research shows that 
LSVCCs: (1) have inefficient statutory governance mechanisms, (2) have low managerial quality, (3) 
have poor returns both in absolute terms, and in comparison to both mutual funds and private venture 
capital funds, (4) are associated with large tax expenditures, (5) have achieved significant capital 
accumulation despite their low returns, and (6) have crowded out more efficient private venture capital 
funds.   
 
We proceed as follows.  Section 2 discusses LSVCC statutory governance.  Section 3 describes 
the tax breaks provided to LSVCCs, and section 4 presents LSVCC capital accumulation relative to other 
types of funds in Canada.  Section 5 discusses LSVCC capital structure choices.  Section 6 describes the 
size of venture capitalist portfolios for different types of venture capital funds.  Section 7 discusses 
evidence on LSVCC crowding out of private venture capital investment in Canada.  Section 8 considers 
comparative evidence on US and Canadian investment performance.  Section 9 summarizes evidence on 





  The traditional venture capital firm in both the United States and Canada is organized as a limited 
partnership (LP) (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2001).  The limited partners are the capital contributors, which 
consist mainly of institutional investors (and in particular pension funds), corporations, and individuals.   
However, contributions are typically subject to a significant minimum contribution requirement, such that, as 
a practical matter, only wealthy individuals invest in such partnerships.  The general partner is the 
management company, which also organizes the fund and solicits investment contributions. 
 
 
     
1   See also Cumming and MacIntosh (2002a) for a related analysis of LSVCC governance in the context of 
crowding out.   3 
 
  In this traditional form of venture capital organization, the relationships between the limited and 
general partners are determined by contract (subject, of course, to general legislation and common law 
dealing with LPs, contract law, taxation, and other matters).  Research by Gompers and Lerner (1996, 
1999) suggests that LP agreements typically contain three types of restrictive covenants:  covenants 
relating to the management of the fund (e.g., the size of investment in any one firm, the use of debt, 
coinvestment, reinvestment of capital gains); covenants relating to the activities of the general partners 
(e.g., coinvestment by general partners, sale of partnership interests, fundraising, the addition of other 
general partners); and covenants restricting particular forms of investment (e.g., investments in other 
venture funds, public securities, leveraged buyouts, foreign securities and other asset classes) (Gompers 
and Lerner, 1996).  Gompers and Lerner also find that the ‘technology’ of restrictive covenants has 
changed over time as experience with venture capital partnerships has accumulated.  Further, the relative 
frequency with which different types of restrictions are used changes over time in response to changes in 
economic conditions.  The form of the contractually-based LP is thus subject to learning over time and is 
responsive to changing economic conditions. 
 
  The LP form is advantageous for a number of reasons. One is the flexibility of the LP form.  
While corporations are subject to an extensive “standard form contract” deriving from the governing 
corporate legislation, LP legislation supplies a minimal set of mandatory rules.  Thus, the LP contract can 
be more highly tailored to the specific interests of the capital contributors and the management company.  
It may also be amended more easily should the need arise.  As noted above, there is evidence that this 
flexibility has been important in the evolution of the LP form. 
 
  Thus, for example, the corporate form imposes limitations on how profits may be distributed.  In 
order to distribute profits differentially to different owners, multiple classes of shares must be created.  By 
contrast, in the LP form, the distribution of profits is entirely contractual in nature, reducing the 
transaction costs of creating a suitable distribution structure. 
 
A further corporate straight-jacket arises in that all shares must be fully paid when subscribed; the 
concept of partly paid shares has been abolished in both the United States and Canada.  This makes it 
awkward to create a corporate structure pursuant to which the fund may draw down money from investors 
when and as needed for particular investment projects.  In a LP, by contrast, the fund may simply enter 
into appropriate contractual arrangements for limited partner draw-downs (from previous contractual 
commitments) when required.   4 
 
 
  Another advantage resides in the tax-advantageous treatment of LPs.  Many of the investors in a 
private fund will be non-taxable institutional entities such as pension funds.  Use of the LP arrangement 
allows for pass-through of the fund’s profits directly to the limited partners, thus avoiding taxation both at 
the fund and investor levels (at least for non-taxable investors) and minimizing the aggregate 
fund/investor tax burden.  This enhances the return to non-tax-paying institutional investors and thus 
makes it easier to attract funds from such investors. 
 
  In addition, use of the LP form lowers the manager’s tax payable.  Because the manager receives 
its remuneration as a contractually agreed share of profits arising from its ownership interest, these profits 
are taxable at the capital gains rate, rather than the higher rate applicable to income.  By contrast, 
limitations on the permissible range of corporate capital structures arising by operation of law make it 
difficult to remunerate the manager via capital gains.  The corporate alternative – a purely contractual 
relationship between the manager and the corporation – leads to the manager’s remuneration being taxed 
at the higher rate applicable to income. 
 
  A further advantage of the LP form relates to the life span of the LP.  An LP typically terminates 
in 10 years, subject to possible extensions with the approval of the limited partners.  This imposes 
discipline on the management company.  Faced with the prospect of returning investors’ capital at a 
specific termination date, the manager has a more potent incentive to manage the fund’s assets efficiently.  
Relatedly, the termination date supplies a benchmark by which the VC can be evaluated.  This is both a 
benefit and a constraint for the management company, in that it gives the manager a performance 
benchmark that will either assist or hinder it in raising money for subsequent VC funds. 
 
  One potential disadvantage of the LP form is that it creates some risk that the limited partners will 
lose their limited liability. In a LP, only the general partner is allowed to manage.  A limited partner that 
participates in the management of the fund is liable to being treated as a general partner, and thus 
deprived of the benefit of limited liability.  This problem is usually dealt with in practice by interposing a 
limited liability corporation between the fund and the investor, although there can be no guarantee that a 
court will not extend liability beyond the corporate shell by “piercing the corporate veil”. 
 
  A related disadvantage stems from the inability of the limited partners to exert significant 
influence over management, or to replace management - a privilege ceded to corporate shareholders (who   5 
 
can at any time replace the managers by voting in a new board of directors).  This problem is partly 
mitigated by the common practice of setting up an advisory board with representatives from the ranks of 
the limited partners, although by its nature the advisory board’s function is merely precatory.   
 
  However, venture capital is a repeat game in which management companies typically seek to 
raise money for further funds in the future.  Thus, reputational constraints tend to ensure alignment of the 
manager’s and the limited partners’ interests.  Further, while a limited partnership itself will lack 
independent directors, such directors can be placed on the board of the management corporation.  The 
management corporation will in fact typically appoint an investment advisory committee that is 
independent of management.  These devices, particularly when viewed in the context of strong 
reputational constraints, tend to compensate for the facially inferior governance regime of the LP. 
 
  The LSVCC structure (similar to the Venture Capital Trust in the U.K.) is materially different 
from the LP structure is many respects.  LSVCCs are set up as corporations, rather than LPs.  Despite 
this, applicable legislation allows LSVCCs to flow fund profits directly to investors, replicating this tax 
advantage of the LP form.  The manager, however, is typically hired on contract, thus exposing the 
manager to the higher tax rate on income.  Thus, the corporate form incompletely replicates the tax 
advantages of the LP form. 
 
  Another disadvantage of the corporate form lies in the fact that, as corporations, LSVCCs have an 
infinite life span.  Thus, the discipline that arises from the fixed time horizon of the LP is lost. 
 
  In addition, LSVCC corporations are subjected to the straight-jacket of the corporate legislation, 
impairing contractual flexibility.  The lack of flexibility of the corporate form is somewhat mitigated in 
that all investors are individuals who, upon the occurrence of a in distribution, receive a share of net asset 
value proportionate to their share holding interest, obviating the need to create a differential distribution 
structure.  However, it is not possible for an LSVCC to effect periodic draw-downs from investors: all 
contributions are paid into the fund at the time when shares are purchased.  This creates an opportunity 
cost for investors, particularly since uninvested funds are typically invested by LSVCCs in low-paying 
bonds and money market instruments.  Moreover, once funds are committed, the various incorporating 
statutes typically require that some percentage of these funds (ranging from 50% to 80%) be invested in 
eligible businesses within one or two years from the date of contribution.  Failure to do so may subject the 
fund to substantial penalties, limits on further fund raising, or the suspension or revocation of the fund’s   6 
 
                                                
registration.  This can have the effect of forcing managers to commit funds to unsuitable investments 
should an investment deadline approach. 
 
  As noted above, the LP structure is determined by negotiation between arms-length commercial 
parties.  By contrast, the LSVCC structure is fixed partly by private negotiation, and partly by the dictates of 
the sponsoring legislation, which are summarized in Table 1.  This legislation adds restrictions on the 
activities of LSVCCs that are not replicated in private LP contracts. 
 
  Thus, for example, as indicated in item #12 of Table 1, investors in LSVCCs are subject to a lock-in 
period of seven years in Manitoba, and eight years in all other jurisdictions except Québec (in which the 
shares must be held until retirement).  Individuals withdrawing prior to the elapse of this period lose their 
LSVCC tax credits (although not the deductability of the contribution, if it was invested via a registered 
retirement savings plan (RRSP), as most contributions are).  By contrast, private LP investors are typically 
locked in for 10 years.  The LSVCCs’ shorter lock-in period (and the ability of investors to make demand 
redemptions following the expiration of the lock-in) force the fund to maintain liquidity against the event of 
redemptions.  This is partly responsible for the overhang of uninvested funds (i.e. funds invested in low risk 
market instruments) referred to in section 4 below.
2  Moreover, the longer duration of private funds and the 
inability of investors to make demand redemptions not only allows for investment of all the contributed 
capital, but also provides more breathing room to bring investee firms to fruition and more flexibility in 
exiting.  In short, the relatively short LSVCC lock-in can be predicted to lower both the risk and expected 
return of LSVCC funds when compared to other types of funds. 
 
Other features of the legislative structure depart from contractual arrangements observed in 
private funds, and are likely to adversely affect performance.  In four provinces (Table 1, item #15) there 
is a limit on the amount of funds raised in any given year, at a threshold (in the range of CAN$20-40 
million) that is likely to prevent the exploitation of economies of scale associated with venture capital 
 
     2  By the end of 1996, the overhang amounted to three years of venture capital investments.  See Canada, 
Department of Finance, 1996 Budget, Budget Plan, annex 5, Tax Measures: Supplementary Information and Notice of 
Ways and Means Motions, March 6, 1996.  The problem of overhang, coupled with the statutory constraints referred to 
in the text forced Canada’s second largest LSVCC to suspend new capital raising for two and a half years (from mid-
1996 to the end of 1998). At the time of suspension, it had only 19% of its contributed capital invested in eligible 
businesses. See "Working Ventures Puts Capital Raising on Hold" at www.newswire.ca...June996/05/c0564.html.  
Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
Act to Create Fonds de solditarité Part X.3 of the Federal The Employee Investment The Manitoba Employee Labour Sponsored New Brunswick Income
du Québec (FTQ); And Act to Income Tax Act. Act. Ownership Fund Venture Capital Tax Act and An Act
create the Fonds de development Corporation Act. Corporations Act Respecting the Workers
de la Confederation des syndicats Investment Funds.
nationaux pour la cooperation et
l'emploi (Fondaction CSN)
1983 (Fonds de solditarité FTQ) 1988 1989 1991 1992 1993/1994
1995 (Fondaction CSN)
Ministry of Finance, Quebec Finance Canada Ministry of Small Business, Department of Industry, Ontario Ministry of Finance New Brunswick
Tourism and Culture Trade and Tourism Department of Finance
To permit establishment of a labour- To allow for establishment To permit establishment of To permit establishment of To allow for the establish- To permit establishment of
sponsored investment fund directed of national labour- a labour-sponsored invest- a labour-sponsored invest- ment of labour-sponsored labour-sponsored invest-
by the FTQ that invests in Quebec sponsored investment ment fund that promotes ment fund that promotes investment funds that ment funds that promote
enterprises with the goal of creating, funds that will supply risk job creation and protection capital retention and a supply risk capital to small capital retention, a stable
maintaining or preserving jobs; capital to small and in all parts of British Colu- stable economy, worker and medium-sized enterp- economy, and job creation
facilitates training of workers in medium sized enterprises mbia through risk capital ownership, employment rises and thereby contri- and protection in New
economic matters, stimulates the and thereby contribute to supply to value-added and continued resident bute to economic develop- Brunswick and, especially
economy through strategic invest- Canadian economic small- and medium-sized ownership of firms in ment, job creation and in relation to the Workers
ments; and invites workers to part- development, job creation firms and that facilitates Manitoba and that contri- protection in Ontario. Investment Fund, that
icipate in economic development and protection. economic and financial butes to other goals, such contribute to other goals,
through subscription to Fund shares. education for workers. as corporate social resp- such as worker participat-
onsibility and worker ion in economic matters.
economic education.
Table 1.  Legislation Governing Labour-sponsored Investment Funds in Canada: An Overview, By Jurisdiction
Saskatchewan (1992), Nova Scotia (1994), and Prince Edward Island (1992) are similar to Part X.3 of the Federal Income Tax Act.
1. What is the legislation called?
2. When was it introduced?
3. What government department is responsible for it?
4. What is the rationale for this statute?
I. THE STATUTE AND RELATED DETAILS  8 
  Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
One Fund is established by each Act; An indefinite number. An indefinite number, though only Originally one, Crocus Invest- An indefinite number. An indefinite number of
i.e., an Act for the Fonds de solditarité one has been authorized by the ment Fund.  Amendments to the national funds and one
(FTQ); an Act for Fondaction (CSN) provincial government to date. Act are being considered to provincial fund.
allow for more than one fund.
The respective Acts A union, as defined by federal A labour body or other work-rel- The Manitoba Federation A provincial labour body; an org- A union, as defined under the Fed-
created the Fonds law, that represents workers in ated organization (with more than of Labour (MFL) is specif- anization of worker co-operatives; eral Income Tax Act; in the case of
solditarité; and Fondaction more than one province or that is 150,000 members in British Colum ied as the Crocus Fund or an entity registered under Part Workers Investment Fund, the New
composed of two or more affiliates bia), as defined by provincial law. sponsor X.3 of the Federal Income Tax Act Brunswick Federation of Labour
Two; the Fonds de solditarité (FTQ) Several are registered; however, One.  The Working Opportunity One.  The Crocus Investment Twenty, including the First Ontario One provincial fund; the Workers
and Fondication (CSN) only two -- Working Ventures CanaFund Fund; legislative changes are Investment Fund (and national Investment Fund, Inc.  So far, only
dian Fund, Inc., and Canadian Med- under consideration to allow for funds, such as the Working Vent- the Working Ventures Canadian
ical Discoveries Fund, Inc. -- curr- more Funds at the discretion of ures Canadian Fund).  One Fund'sFund, Inc., and the Canadian Med-
ently operate fully (i.e., they both the Minister. registration has been subsequentlyical Discoveries Fund, Inc., are
raise capital and invest) as nat- withdrawn fully operative (i.e., they both raise
ional funds in up to five provinces. capital and invest) as national
funds in New Brunswick
Class A (common) shares Class A (common) shares Class A (common) shares Class A (common) shares Class A (common) shares Class A (common) shares
issued to individuals; issued to individuals; issued to individuals issued to individuals; issued to individuals; issued to individuals;
Class G shares without Class B shares issued to Class G shares issued to Class B shares issued to Class B shares issued to
voting rights have been the labour sponsor; others Manitoba's Minister of the labour sponsor; others the labour sponsor; others
issued to the FTQ and the determined as necessary Finance; Class I shares determined as necessary determined as necessary
government of Quebec. by the fund and as issued to institutional inv- by the fund by the fund
The Fund administrators approved by the Minister estors (e.g., pension
may issue other categ- of Finance funds); and Class L shares
ories of shares which do issued to the labour
not confer voting rights at sponsor
the shareholders meeting
Class A shares only Class A shares only Class A shares only Class A shares only Class A shares only Class A shares only
9. Which receive a tax benefit?
5. How many funds can be created?
6. Who can create a fund?
7. How many funds have been established under this statute so far (March 1997)?
8. What kinds of shares can a fund issue?  9 
  Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
15% provincial credit 15% federal credit with or without 15% provincial credit 15% provincial credit 15% provincial credit 15% provincial credit
(along with matching a matching credit in every province(along with matching (along with matching (along with matching (along with matching
federal credit).  This except Alberta and Newfoundland federal credit).  This federal credit).  This federal credit).  This federal credit).  This
applies to a maximum of (national funds obtain the second applies to a maximum of applies to a maximum of applies to a maximum of applies to a maximum of
$3500 in annual share credit only by satisfying govern- $3500 in annual share $3500 in annual share $3500 in annual share $3500 in annual share
purchases per taxpayer ment needs on a province-by-prov-purchases per taxpayer purchases per taxpayer purchases per taxpayer purchases per taxpayer
ince basis).  This applies to a max-
imum of $3500 in annual share
purchases per taxpayer.
Any person.  Quebec residency is Any individual resident of Any individual resident of British Any resident of Manitoba Any resident of Ontario at Any resident of New
one of the factors determining if an Canada at the time of Columbia (defined as being empl- at the time of buying the time of buying shares Brunswick at the time of
individual is eligible for tax credits. buying shares oyed on a continuing basis for at shares buying shares
least 20 hours per week).
Until shareholder's retirement (age 60- Eight years (previously, it Eight years Seven years Eight years (previously, it Eight years (previously, it
65, or 55, if the shareholder avails him-was five years) was five years) was five years)
self of his right of retirement or early
retirement).
Yes. Shares can be redeemed earlier Yes. Shares can be redeemed Yes. Shares can be redeemed Yes. Shares can be redeemed Yes. Shares can be redeemed Yes. Shares can be redeemed
under special circumstances, e.g., earlier in the event of the holder's earlier in the event of the holder's earlier in the event of the holder'searlier in the event of the holder's earlier in the event of the holder's
planned retirement, a return to school, death, severe illness/disability, or death, severe illness/disability, holder's death, severe illness/ death, severe illness/disability, or death, severe illness/disability, or
terminal illness, investment in one's change of nationality or in the bankruptcy, job loss, (persisting disability, retirement or financial in the event of sales/transfers in the event of sales/transfers
company, emigration, an urgent need event of sales/transfers (per set for at least six months) or in the hardship or in the event of sales/ (per set conditions) (per set conditions)
for liquidity, and a serious reduction conditions) event of sales/transfer (per set transfers (per set conditions)
in income conditions)
Yes.  Quebec employers must remit No No Yes.  Manitoba employers must No Yes, but only for the Workers Inv-
deductions to the fund if the lesser of remit deductions to the fund if estment Fund.  NB employers must
fifty employees or 20% of the total the lesser of fifty employees or remit deductions to this fund if the
workforce so request 20% of the total workforce so lesser of 50 employees or 20% of
request the total workforce so request
13. Are there any exceptions?
14. Are any payroll deductions encouraged?
10. What is the tax benefit?
11. Who can be a (common) shareholder?
12. How long must shares be held?  10 
 
Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
Not presently.  There was No Yes. No more than a total Yes.  No more than a total No No
a temporary ceiling of $40 million can be of $30 million (or as deter-
imposed by provincial raised annually mined by the provincial
authorities in the period government) can be raised
1993-1994 annually
Yes No No Yes Yes (in the case of First No
Ontario Fund)
The Commission des The securities commission The British Columbia The Manitoba Securities The Ontario Securities The New Brunswick
valeurs mobilieres du or the appropriate authority Securities Commission Commission Commission Department of Justice
Québec in each province where
sales occur
Protecting the public in Protecting the public in Protecting the public in Protecting the public in Protecting the public in Protecting the public in
share sales transactions, share sales transactions, share sales transactions, share sales transactions, share sales transactions, share sales transactions,
information disclosure information disclosure information disclosure information disclosure information disclosure information disclosure
requirements, etc. requirements, etc. requirements, etc. requirements, etc. requirements, etc. requirements, etc.
No. Not applicable. No. No.  (But Saskatchewan is Yes. Yes.  (Nova Scotia and Prince
open.) Edward Island are also open.
Until shareholder's age of retirement. Eight. Eight. Seven. Eight. Eight.
Yes. No. No. Yes. Yes (First-Ontario LSVCC). No.
Restrictions of subsequent capital- Deficiency taxes. Temporary suspension or revoc- Temporary suspension or revoc- Deficiency taxes. Deficiency taxes.
raising. ation of fund registration. ation of fund registration.
22. What are the investment level enforcement measures (see also #31)?
15. Is there a limit on how much capital can be raised per year through share sales?
16. Does the Act allow for the sale of shares by representatives trained by the Fund, including employees and/or Fund representatives?
17. What public authority monitors a fund's sales activity?
18. What is the role of regulatory authorities?
19. What provinces are currently open to national funds?
20. What is the required period of fund shareholding?
21. Does the jurisdiction allow for Union-directed share distributions?
II. RULES GOVERNING SHARE DISTRIBUTIONS  11 
  Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
A Board of Directors, a majority of A Board of Directors, at least one- A Board of Directors, at least one- A Board of Directors, a majority A Board of Directors, at least one- A Board of Directors, at least one-
whom are nominated by the FTQ, i.e., half of whom are nominated by the half of whom are nominated by the of whom are nominated by the half of whom are nominated by thehalf of whom are nominated by the
10 members labour sponsor labour sponsor Manitoba Federation of Labour labour sponsor labour sponsor (in the case of the
Workers Investment Fund, the New
Brunswick Federation of Labour).
-- 2 members elected by shareholders Shareholder represen- Shareholder represen- Elected or appointed Shareholder represen- Shareholder represen-
-- 4 members representing: individual tatives elected at an tatives elected at an representatives of Class A, tatives elected at an tatives elected at an
enterprises, financial institutions, soc- annual general meeting annual general meeting Class G and Class I annual general meeting annual general meeting
ial-economic interests, and a fourth -- and others as determined and others as determined shareholders and others as determined and others as determined
the 17th member is the President/CEOby the labour sponsor by the labour sponsor by the labour sponsor by the labour sponsor
of the Fund
A small- or medium-sized A small- or medium-sized A small- or medium-sized A small- or medium-sized A small- or medium-sized compa- A small- or medium-sized
company/partnership company/partnership company/partnership company/partnership ny/partnership (defined as having company/partnership
(defined as having no more (defined as having no more in a new and/or value- (defined as having a max- no more than 500 employees and (defined as having no more
than $50 million in assets; than 500 employees and added sector (e.g., manu- imum of $50 million in $50 million in assets). At least 10%than 500 employees and
or the net value of which is $50 million in assets) facturing and processing assets).  One-quarter of of total investments must go to $50 million in assets).
a maximum $20 million). industries, high technol- newly-raised capital must very small companies (defined as
ogy, tourism, aquaculture). go towards deal sizes of having no more than 50 employ-
less than $1 million. ees and $5 million in assets)
Anywhere, as long as the At least one-half of company act- At least one-half of company act- The majority of a com- At least one-half of company act- At least one-half of company act-
majority of employees ivity (e.g., defined as 50% of sal- ivity (e.g., defined by 50% of sal- pany's assets and work- ivity (e.g., defined as 50% of sal- ivity (e.g., defined as 50% of sal-
reside in Québec aries and wages paid) must take aries and wages paid) and most force must reside in aries and wages paid) must take aries and wages paid) must take
place in Canada assets must reside in B.C. Manitoba place in Ontario. place in New Brunswick
Any financial assistance in the form of New equity in a company, New equity in a company, New equity in a company, New equity in a company, New equity in a company,
loan, underwriting, equity, shares, etc. et al et al et al et al et al
IV. REQUIREMENTS OF INVESTMENT
25. In what kinds of business must a fund invest?
26. Where can a business be located?
27. What is the nature of the investment?
III. FUND DECISION MAKING
23. Who directs a fund?
24. Who else sits of a Board of Directors?  12 
  Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
60% of previous year's average. 60% within one year. 80% within three years of capital 60% of previous year's 70% within two years. 60% within one year.
raising. average.
No No Yes.  For instance, a company Yes.  For instance, the Yes. For instance, a company can-No
cannot re-lend the money or inv- money cannot be used not invest the money in land unrel-
est in activity unrelated to the firm to unionize workers ated to the firm or outside Canada
At least 60% of the previous year's 60% of capital accumulated by 80% of capital must be At least 60% of capital of the 50% of capital must be 60% of capital accumulated by
average net assets. each year's end must be placed placed in eligible projects previous year's average net placed in projects within each year's end must be placed in
in projects by the following year. within three years of it capital.  For the period 1996-97, one year of having it and projects by the following year.  In
(Special provisions apply for inv- having been raised the requirement was 75%.  A 70% within two years the case of national funds, the pro-
estments in very small companies, majority of assets should supp- vincial government determines ind-
i.e., with up to $10 million in assets ort worker ownership and ividual agreements for re-invest-
participation in some form ment of sales proceeds in N.B.
The fund is restricted in The fund pays a 20% deficiency A fund's registration may The fund's registration may The fund pays a 20% The fund pays a 20% deficiency
subsequent capital raising tax and additional penalties (includ be temporarily suspended be permanently revoked deficiency tax.  A rebate tax and additional penalties (inclu-
ing possible revocation of a poss- or revoked, depending on this tax is available ding possible revocation of a fund's
ible revocation of a fund's registr- upon the circumstances if appropriate action is registration) depending upon the
ation) depending upon the case. taken by the fund. circumstances.
In reserves of liquid securities (e.g., Primarily, in reserves of liquid sec- Primarily, in reserves of liquid sec- Primarily, in reserves of liquid Primarily, in reserves of liquid sec- Primarily, in reserves of liquid sec-
cash, government bonds) or in other urities (e.g., cash, government urities (e.g., cash, government securities (e.g., cash, govern- urities (e.g., cash, government urities (e.g., cash, government
vehicles according to the investment bonds) in the start-up period.  The-bonds). Generally, assets must ment bonds) or as determined bonds). Generally, assets must bonds) in the start-up period.  The-
policy approved by the Board of Dir. reafter, as determined by a fund. be invested domestically. by the fund. be invested domestically. reafter, as determined by a fund.
Yes. For instance, the No Yes. For instance, a fund is enc- Yes. For instance, the fund is No Yes. The Workers Invest-
fund is encouraged to ouraged to provide education to encouraged to emphasize work- ment Fund is encouraged,
provide training to workers workers on economic and finan- er ownership, economic educ- for instance, to promote
on economic and financial cial matters and give priority to comation and empowerment of work- economic awareness and
matters and to give munity and regional economic ers, and corporate social empowerment of workers.
economic development development. responsibility
28. What is the required level of fund capital in equity (i.e., no debt securities) investments?
33. Are there other investment-related program requirements?
29. Are there limits as to how a business can use a fund's investment?
30. What level of total capital must be invested in business projects?
31. What happens if this level is not met?
32. How are the rest of the assets to be invested?  13 
 
Québec Federal Government British Columbia Manitoba Ontario New Brunswick
No No Yes.  A fund is restricted Yes.  A fund is restricted Yes.  No more than 15% No
from investing is natural from investing is natural of a fund's total investment
resource industries (e.g., resource industries (e.g., can go towards publicly-
fishing, forest products, agriculture, mining, oil and traded enterprises
mining), the financial gas), the financial sector
sector, land development land development and
and retail retail
No more than 5% of the The lesser of $15 million or No more than $5 million No more than 10% of No more than $10 million No more than $10 million
fund's total capital (or up 10% of fund capital at the per company for a period total fund capital at the or 10% of fund capital or 10% of fund capital
to 10% under special time of an investment of two years time of an investment at the time of an invest- at the time of invest-
circumstances) at the time ment, whichever is less ment, whichever is less
of an investment
No No Yes. Majority control is No.  Majority control is Yes. Majority control is No
not permitted except under encouraged if it facilitates permitted by the Ontario
special circumstances worker buyouts/owners Minister of Finance on a
(e.g., worker buyouts/ hip temporary basis in select
ownership or financial situations (e.g., worker
distress) buyouts, financial distress)
36. Is a fund restricted as to its controlling share in a business?
V. RESTRICTIONS ON INVESTMENT
34. Is a fund restricted from investing in certain firms or sectors?
35. How much can a fund invest in a single business? 
                                                
investing.  Further, in response to the common practice of placing up to half or more of a fund’s capital in 
treasury bills and similar low risk instruments (the problem of “overhang” referred to above), all of the 
provinces now require that an LSVCC invest a certain portion of its capital contributions in eligible 
businesses within one or two years of receipt (Table 1, items #28, 30-31).  As noted above, this can have 
the effect of forcing the fund to invest in inferior businesses if an investment deadline looms. 
 
  LSVCCs are also geographically constrained; typically a majority of the salaries and wages paid 
by the fund (or assets or employment) must be located within the sponsoring province (Table 1, item 
#26).  This limits the businesses that can be vetted for investment purposes, and may also impose a 
constraint on any relocation of the business as it grows and/or participation in follow-on investments.  In 
Ontario (the province in which the majority of LSVCC investments are made), the fund cannot acquire 
“control”.  However, this constraint may be more apparent than real, since control is defined as the ability 
to “determine the strategic operating, investing and financing policies of the corporation or partnership 
without the co-operation of another person”.
3  The provincial administrators take the view that this does 
not prohibit a shareholding in excess of 50%.  A similar prohibition against control in B.C. is defined in 
the traditional manner, excluding majority ownership, thus limiting a B.C. fund’s governance options. 
 
While private venture capital LPs rigorously and single-mindedly pursue profit maximization.  
By contrast, while the principle motivation that underlies the LSVCC legislation is to enhance the local 
pool of venture capital, LSVCCs invariably have divided statutory mandates.  Thus, for example, 
Quebec’s two funds (each formed pursuant to special incorporating legislation) has the multiple mandate 
of creating, maintaining and preserving jobs in Quebec, facilitating the training of workers, stimulating 
the economy through strategic investing, and furthering the participation of workers in economic 
development through subscriptions to fund shares.  Some of all of the non-profit making goals of the 
Quebec legislation are replicated in the legislation of the other sponsoring jurisdictions.  The multiple 
mandate of the LSVCC funds can be predicted to dilute the vigour with which management will pursue 
profits for investors.   However, the degree to which these non-profit-making goals are pursued in practice 
varies substantially.  The Quebec funds appear to pursue these goals with some vigour  (MacIntosh, 1994; 
Halpern, 1997). However, Osborne and Sandler suggest that in Ontario (where more than half of all 
venture capital investments by dollar value are made), there is essentially no consideration of objectives 
other than profit maximization (Osborne and Sandler, 1998). This appears also to be true of funds 
incorporated in other provinces (i.e. outside of Quebec). 
 
     
3  Community Small Business Investment Funds Act, S.O. 1992, c. 18, s.1(3).   15 
 
 
In both the LP and the LSVCC, there is a separation of ownership and control.   In the LP, as 
noted above, investors may only sit on advisory boards and may not direct the fund managers.  In the case 
of LSVCCs, under the sponsoring legislation of all jurisdictions, the labour union sponsor must elect a 
majority of the board of directors.  Thus, the fund’s owners (the shareholders) cede control of the fund to 
the union. 
 
However, in the case of a private LP, the limited partners hold relatively large interests.  This 
greatly assists in overcoming collective action and free rider problems, since holders of substantial 
interests have an incentive to monitor management, even if they cannot directly control management.  By 
contrast, only individuals may invest in an LSVCC, and most contributions are of CAN$5,000 or less 
(Vaillancourt, 1997).  This generates substantial collective action and free rider problems and gives 
individual shareholders little incentive to supply any useful monitoring.  In addition, while institutional 
investors tend to be informed traders, the retail contributors to LSVCC funds will tend to be noise traders 
incapable of supplying useful monitoring even if supplied with appropriate incentives. 
 
Perhaps more important, the controller of an LP (the management company functioning as 
general partner) has a potent incentive to exercise its control in the interest of the fund’s owners, since, 
via the carried interest component of compensation, it will typically receive 20% of any appreciation in 
the value of the fund’s assets.  By contrast, in an LSVCC, the union has a substantially smaller economic 
interest in the fund.  For acting as sponsor, it will typically receive either a fixed yearly fee, or a small 
percentage of the net asset value of the fund.  In the first case, there is no incentive at all to maximize the 
value of the fund (although there is an incentive to ensure its survival).  In the second case, the variable 
fee is similar to the manager’s carried interest and serves to align the union’s interest with that of the 
shareholders.  However, the variable fee is typically a fraction of a percent of net asset value, and thus a 
highly imperfect (perhaps even trivial) motivator.   
 
While the manager will be motivated by the receipt of carried interest fees that are similar to 
those of private funds, the manager does not formally control the fund, and is thus subject to the whims of 
the controlling union.  The LSVCCs thus appear to have an inefficient governance structure, and one that 
can be predicted to result in higher agency costs than private funds.   
 
In some funds, these problems are addressed by contract: the union will contract with the   16 
 
manager to allow the latter to specify the identity of the union’s board nominees.  The disadvantage of the 
statutory union control requirement is thus negatived by contract.  Such arrangements are not universal, 
however; in many cases, the union makes its own appointments. 
 
Another attempt to overcome these governance problems is thorugh the mechanism of the 
LSVCC’s board of directors.  It is common practice for LSVCCs to appoint independent directors to 
LSVCC boards.  In addition, independent directors often control key committees, such as the audit, 
investment, and valuation committees.  Despite these salutary attempts to ensure sound governance, 
however, extant empirical evidence is highly equivocal as to whether independent corporate directors add 
material value to an enterprise. 
 
Moreover, there are few LSVCC funds in which the organizer – typically the management 
company (and not the sponsoring union) – performs all of the services performed by the manager of a 
private fund.  LSVCC funds typically hire a bevy of external experts to assist in various functions such as 
portfolio management, valuation of assets, sales and marketing, back office functions and administration, 
etc.  This has the effect of separating critical functions (often including investment and portfolio 
management) from direct corporate control. 
 
  In sum, the legislative, the structure of LSVCC funds leads us to hypothesize that the LSVCC is an 
inferior form of venture capital organization that will exhibit relatively high agency costs and low returns 
relative to private venture capital funds.  We consider the performance of LSVCCs in the following sections. 
 
3. LSVCC Tax Policy 
 
  In order to attract investment, the various jurisdictions allowing for the creation of LSVCCs offer 
individual investors generous tax credits.  The current tax incentives (as of August 2002) for investing in a 
LSVCC in Ontario are detailed in Table 2.  On an investment of up to CAN$5,000, individual investors 
receive a combined federal and provincial tax credit of 30% and can simultaneously use the investment as a 
tax deduction, for a total after-tax cost of about $1,000-$2,000 on a $5,000 investment, depending on the 
individual’s income (see Table 2 for exact details). The governmental sponsors effectively pay the balance 
of the cost.  An individual investor remaining invested for the required hold period will realize a return on   17 
 
                                                
the investment in excess of 100%, even if the fund makes no profits for distribution.
4  The tax benefits in 
each of the other provinces are indicated in Table 1, item #10. 
 
  The tax-expenditure cost of LSVCCs to the Canadian government are extremely large: Osbourne 
and Sandler (1998) estimate such costs to be approximately CAN$ 450 million for one year (1996) alone, 
without accounting for RRSP tax deduction costs.    It seems quite clear that these tax incentives have been 
the engine behind the spectacular growth of the LSVCC funds (Vaillancourt, 1997), and have made 
LSVCCs an attractive asset class for individual investors in a way that is at least partially decoupled from 
the underlying fundamentals of the investment (see section 4 below). 
 
4. LSVCC Capital Accumulation 
 
  LSVCCs have accumulated more capital than the sum total of all other types of private equity 
investors in Canada (including limited partnerships and corporate funds).  By the end of 2001, LSVCCs had 
accumulated more than CAN$11 billion (US$ 7 billion) capital under management (in 2001 dollars).  Figure 
1 indicates the growth of LSVCC capital over the 1992 – 2001 period (the years for which the Canadian 
Venture Capital Association (CVCA) has reported this information in their annual reports
5). 
 
  Figure 2 presents data for capital under management, capital available for investment and new 
venture funds for the 1988-2001 period (again, the years the CVCA has reported this information in their 
annual reports).  The capital available for investment reflects the extent to which contributions to venture 
capital funds have outstripped the funds’ ability to invest these contributions.  It can be seen from Figure 
2 that, historically, there has been a large “overhang” of uninvested capital in Canada.  This overhang is 
largely attributable to the LSVCCs.   By the end of 1996, the overhang amounted to approximately three 
years of venture capital investments (Department of Finance (Canada), 1996).   The problem of overhang 
forced Canada’s second largest LSVCC (Working Ventures) to suspend new capital raising for two and a 
 
     
4  The minimum hold period in each jurisdiction is typically 8 years.  Early withdrawal of contributed funds 
results in a penalty fee.  Note that all dollar figures are in Canadian dollars.  
     
5  Figure 1 is presented in the CVCA Annual Reports (see www.cvca.ca and www.canadavc.com). See also 
Macdonald (1992); MacIntosh (1994, 1997), Amit et al. (1997, 1998); Cumming (2000); Ayayi (2002a).  














Registered Retirement Savings Plan (RRSP) 
Investment
$5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000 $5,000
Federal Tax Credit $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750
Provincial Tax Credit* $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750 $750
Combined Federal and Provincial Tax Credit $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500
RRSP Tax Savings $1,110 $1,410 $1,560 $1,655 $1,855 $1,970 $2,170 $2,320
Combined Federal and Provincial Income Tax 
Rates
Up to 22.20% 28.20% 31.20% 33.10% 37.10% 39.40% 43.40% 46.40%
Total Tax Credits and Tax Savings Up to $2,610 $2,910 $3,060 $3,155 $3,355 $3,470 $3,670 $3,820
Net Out of Pocket Cost on $5,000 Investment At least $2,390 $2,090 $1,940 $1,845 $1,645 $1,530 $1,330 $1,180
Initial Return** = ($5,000 - Out of Pocket Cost) / 
Out of Pocket Cost
109.21% 139.23% 157.73% 171.00% 203.95% 226.80% 275.94% 323.73%
Table 2.  Labour Sponsored Investment Fund (LSIF) Tax Savings Chart
Source: http://www.bestcapital.ca/why_invest.htm, and Department of Finance, Canada.
** Initial Return calculation does not account for any returns (losses) that may or may not be generated by a LSIFs' investment activities.
* Ontario provincial rates are used in this chart.  For other provincial rates, see Table 1, item #13.
This table presents the tax savings associated with an individual LSIF investment of $5,000.  The table shows that returns vary from at least 109.21% to up to 323.73% from the tax savings only, 
before any gains or losses on the net asset value of the LSIF.
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￿ Capital Under Management 
                                                
half years (from mid-1996 to the end of 1998). At the time of suspension, Working Ventures had only 19% 
of its contributed capital invested in eligible businesses.
6 
 
  It is noteworthy that the uninvested capital in Figure 2 is understated.  The Canadian Venture 
Capital Association assumes that LSVCCs must keep a certain percentage in liquid securities when 
calculating the overhang of uninvested capital (40% for federal and Quebec LSVCCs, 30% for Ontario, 
Saskatchewan and Atlantic Canada LSVCCs, 25% for Manitoba LSVCCs, and 20% for LSVCCs in British 
Columbia).  This is incorrect.  There is no such requirement in the LSVCC statutes (see Table 1).  As such, 
the uninvested capital in Figure 2 (the middle bars labelled Capital for Investment) is in fact significantly 
high than that reported.  As it is not possible to precisely calculate the correct values, Figure 2 reports the 
same (understated) values for the overhang as reported by the Canadian Venture Capital Association. 
 
  There appear to be a number of reasons for the LSVCCs’ inability to invest all of their 
contributed capital.  LSVCCs raise most of their money through contributions to individual registered 
retirement savings plans (RRSPs), which roughly correspond to 401k plans in the United States.   Most of 
the fund raising of LSVCCs takes place in last three months preceding the tax filing deadline of each year 
(April 30), allowing contributing investors to claim tax the LSVCC tax credits (and deductability, if the 
contribution is made through an RRSP) for the preceding tax year.    This makes LSVCC fund raising 
“lumpy”, concentrating contributions at one time of the year, raising the likelihood of a mismatch 
between funds flow and available investment opportunities, and contributing to the overhang problem. 
 
In addition, LSVCC investors were, until 1996, locked into their investments for only five years, 
following which they could demand redemption at net asset value.  While the lock-in period has been 
increased to 8 years in most jurisdictions (although in Quebec, shareholders must hold until retirement), 
the lock-in period is nonetheless still shorter than  that of private funds (ten years, with possible 
extensions).  This has prompted the LSVCCs to retain a certain proportion of capital in liquid investments 
such as treasury bills and bank deposits to satisfy demand redemptions. 
 
We also believe that the overhang problem is a function of the comparative lack of skill of the 
LSVCC managers, who have had more difficulty than their private fund counterparts in finding promising 
investments.  Evidence consistent with lower skill levels is presented in Brander et al. (2002) and 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2000, 2001, 2002a,b,c,d). 
 
     
6  See "Working Ventures Puts Capital Raising on Hold" at www.newswire.ca...June996/05/c0564.html.   22 
 
 
                                                
5. LSVCCs and Capital Structure Choice for Entrepreneurial Firms 
 
  In addition to lower skill, the statutory constraints faced by LSVCCs may lead LSVCC managers 
to make inefficient decisions from the perspective of the entrepreneurial firm.  One such inefficient 
outcome relates to the security used to finance the entrepreneurial firm, as explained by Cumming (2000); 
see also Ayayi (2002b).  LSVCC legislation typically requires that 60% of contributed capital be invested in 
non-debt securities (see Table 1, #28; see Gompers and Lerner, 1996, for similar restrictive covenants used 
among U.S. limited partnerships).  LSVCCs have an incentive to invest the balance in debt-type securities 
for two reasons.  First, the spectacular growth of the LSVCCs, the large tax expenditures that have spurred 
this growth, and the extremely poor earnings reported by the LSVCCs (as discussed further below) have 
attracted a certain amount of adverse public attention to the LSVCCs.  Second, extremely poor returns on 
their equity portfolios have prompted some of the LSVCCs, for obvious marketing purposes, to seek 
alternative investment strategies in order to show a positive return.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that both 
of these factors have led some of the LSVCCs to employ relatively low-risk debt instruments in order to 
turn a profit.
7 Cumming (2000) presents empirical evidence in support of the view that this has sometimes 
led LSVCCs to employ debt, rather than comparatively more efficient equity securities in structuring their 
investments in investee firms. 
 
6. LSVCCs and Portfolio Size 
 
  Recent research has explored the issue of the optimal size of venture capitalist’s portfolio from a 
theoretical perspective (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2000, 2001; see also Keuschnigg, 2002, and 
Keuschnigg and Nielsen, 2001, 2002).  In the Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2000, 2001) model, as the 
management company adds more firms to its portfolio, the ability to add value declines, since the provision 
of advice is costly for the manager.    Other things being equal, diluted advice lowers the expected return to 
the project.  However, since effort is costly for the entrepreneur also, too low an expected return will cause 
shirking.  Therefore, in a setting with two-sided moral hazard, and unverifiable and unenforceable actions, 
the VC must cede a higher proportion of the firm to the entrepreneur in order to elicit a high level of effort. .  
 
     
7  This observation was first made by Mary Macdonald of Macdonald & Associates, Limited (the firm that 
collects data for the Canadian Venture Capital Association) during a lecture at the University of Toronto Law School in 
February 1998.   23 
 
                                                
In sum, adding a firm decreases the marginal benefit (i.e., VC retains a lower portion of the firm) and 
increases marginal costs (i.e., the VC has to provide more advice and the cost function is convex). 
 
  Cumming (2001, updated October 2002) tests the Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2000, 2001) theory 
using a sample of 214 venture capital funds, with consideration to the characteristics of the financing 
transaction (staging, syndication, and the use of convertible securities), the characteristics of the 
entrepreneurial firm (stage of development and whether high-technology or not), the venture capital fund 
characteristics (VC fundraising, VC fund duration, and the number of VC funds operated by the VC firm), 
and the type of VC fund (corporate VCs, private limited partnerships, government VCs, institutional VCs, 
and LSVCCs).  Cumming’s (2001) summary statistics indicate that LSVCCs have the largest portfolios on 
average (38 entrepreneurial firms per fund), followed by government VCs (32 firms per fund), institutional 
investors (31 firms per fund), corporate VCs (17 entrepreneurial firms in the portfolio), and private limited 
partnerships (with an average of 8 entrepreneurial firms per fund).  That LSVCCs have larger portfolios is a 
statistically and economically significant result in Cumming’s (2001) multivariate regression analysis based 
on OLS as well as various Box-Cox specifications.  This evidence is highly suggestive that LSVCCs add 
less value to their entrepreneurial firms than do other types of venture capitalists. 
 
7. LSVCCs and Crowding Out 
 
  Figure 3 presents the Canadian Venture Capital Association data on the types of entrepreneurial 
firms that received venture finance in Canada before and after the introduction of LSVCCs in the various 
Canadian jurisdictions in the 1980s and early 1990s (as indicated in Table 1).  The amount of venture 
finance increased in Canada, particularly for start-up and expansion investment, after the introduction of 
LSVCC legislation in Canada.  Based on this one-dimensional analysis of the data, it is commonly 
believed that the LSVCC programs have led to a significant increase in the aggregate pool of venture 
capital funding in Canada.  
 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2002a), however, point out that if LSVCC growth has simply come at 
the expense of other types of funds (i.e. LSVCC funds have “crowded out” other funds), then the LSVCC 
programs may not in fact have added to the pool of venture capital.
 8  In order to test for crowding out, 
 
     
8  See Cressy (2002), Gompers and Lerner (2001), and Lerner (1999, 2002) for an analysis of capital gaps and 
government sponsorship of venture capital.  
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Cumming and MacIntosh construct simultaneous supply and demand equations for venture capital based 
on data spanning the period the 1977-2001 period.  Variables used to construct these equations include 
GDP growth, Toronto Stock exchange returns, real interest rates, the tech bubble, and the number of new 
companies incorporating under both provincial and federal legislation.  Dummy variables are used to test 
for the effect of the introduction of LSVCC legislation in each province and at the federal level.  A 
bootstrap experiment and other robustness checks are employed. 
 
Counter to the conventional wisdom, Cumming and MacIntosh find strong evidence that 
LSVCCs have crowded out other types of venture capital funds, including private LPs.  The estimated 
coefficients suggest that this crowding out has been sufficiently energetic to reduce the aggregate pool of 
Canadian venture capital by approximately 400 investments, or CAN$1 billion per annum.  This 
displacement has been achieved at considerable cost to the government.  A rough calculation indicates 
that total tax expenditures by the various provincial governments and the federal government total 
approximately CAN$3-4 billion, without including the costs of RRSP deductability.
9  It would appear that 
the various Canadian governments are spending a large sum of money for the privilege of achieving a 
reduction in VC investing in Canada. 
 
  What is the crowding out mechanism?  Because of tax subsidies to LSVCC investors, an LSVCC 
fund can afford to earn nothing on its investments and still achieve a handsome return for its investors.  
For example, in Ontario, an investor holding for the mandatory hold period of eight years will realize a 
return on investment of approximately 100 per cent even if the fund earns a zero return.  Thus, the 
LSVCC’s have an extremely low required rate of return.  By contrast, even though many investors in 
private LPs are non-taxable, there is no tax subsidy to such investments.  If the fund’s return is zero, then 
that is the return realized by the funds investors.  Private LPs have a required rate of return that truly 
reflects the opportunity cost of a venture capital investment, which will be significantly higher than the 
LSVCC rate. 
 
The result of these differential required rates of return is that, in respect of any given investment 
opportunity, an LSVCC can always outbid a private fund and still meet its required rate of return.  Under 
these circumstances, it is not surprising that the level of funding for private LPs remained static through 
 
     
9  It is appropriate to add RRSP deduction tax expenditures only if those making RRSP contributions to 
LSVCCs would not otherwise be making RRSP contributions.  Vaillancourt’s (1997) evidence suggests that this is 
often the case, however.   26 
 
                                                
the 1990’s (while the LSVCCs were experiencing rapid growth), and expanded only in response to the 
technology bubble that started in 1999 and ended in 2001. 
 
Exacerbating the problem of crowding out is the possibility that LSVCC investment will increase 
in the future, either because the rate of LSVCC contributions will accelerate, or the LSVCC funds will 
increase the rate at which they invest their uninvested capital, in order to escape statutory non-investment 
penalties.  Institutional investors have historically been skittish venture capital investors, herding into the 
market when returns are good, and herding out when they are not (Gompers and Lerner, 1999, 2000, 
2001).  Anecdotal evidence supports the view that Canadian institutions have tended to stay out of the 
market because of insufficient returns on their venture capital investments.  While this aversion to VC 
investing is often blamed purely on institutional risk aversion, it now seems clear that the LSVCC 
programs are a principal cause of this reluctance, by depressing the returns to private LP funds. 
 
8. Comparisons Between Canada and the United States 
 
In a sequence of papers, Cumming and MacIntosh compare Canadian and U.S. venture capitalists 
in terms of duration of investment (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2001, 2002d), choice of exit vehicle 
(Cumming and MacIntosh, 2000), and extent of exit (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2002b,c).  The overall 
result of these inquiries is to suggest that Canadian VCs are skilled than their U.S. counterparts.  We 
attribute much of this underperformance to the LSVCC funds. 
 
Thus, for example, in our discussion of the duration of venture capital investments (Cumming and 
MacIntosh, 2001, 2002d), we find evidence that our theoretical framework works much better in the U.S. 
than in Canada.  We attribute this to randomisation in exit behaviour in Canada resulting from 
comparative lack of managerial skill.  We also find that average duration is longer in Canada than in the 
U.S., consistent with the view that Canadian VCs do not add as much value to their investee firms (and 
therefore require a longer time to bring these firms to an exit-ready state). 
 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2000) also examine the range of exit vehicles used in Canada and the 
U.S. (IPOs, acquisitions, secondary sales, buybacks, and write-offs).
10  The Canadian distribution of exit 
 
     
10  An IPO involves the sale of shares in the firm to the public market on a stock exchange for the first time in 
the firm’s history.  In an acquisition exit, a large corporation purchases the entrepreneur’s and venture capitalist’s   27 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
outcomes (for the years in which the CVCA has presented the data) is presented in Figure 4a.  The gross 
returns to the alternative exit vehicles are presented in Figure 4b (internal rates of return (IRRs) are not 
available in the CVCA data; see Cumming and MacIntosh, 2000, for IRRs for the exit outcomes in 
Canada from 1992 – 1995).  This data, when compared to the U.S. data, shows that, in Canada, relatively 
inferior forms of exit - buybacks and secondary sales  (see Figure 4b) - are used with much greater 
frequency.  The frequency with which these exit types are used has increased contemporaneously with the 
growth of the LSVCCs.  Our data also indicate that acquisition exits, a relatively superior form of exit, are 
used with far lower frequency in Canada than the U.S.  The data also disclose that Canadian VCs earn 
lower overall returns than U.S. VCs, as discussed in the following section.  
 
9. LSVCC Performance 
 
Figure 5 presents the performance of LSVCCs over the past 10 years.
11  Consistent with the exits 
evidence documented in Figures 4a and 4b, Figure 5 clearly indicates that LSVCCs have underperformed 
comparable indices.
12  The LSVCC underperformance supports the view that LSVCC structure and 
governance is inefficient, as detailed in section 2 and Table 1.  It is also consistent with related evidence 
documenting inferior LSVCC performance relative to US venture investments (see Cumming and 
 
interest in the company.  A merger is similar to an acquisition, but the acquiring corporation is of similar size to the 
entrepreneurial firm at the time of exit.  A secondary sale involves the sale of the venture capitalist’s interest to 
another company, but the entrepreneur retains his or her shares.  A buyback is a repurchase on the venture 
capitalist’s interest in the company by the entrepreneur.  A write-off is a liquidation of the investment.  Cumming 
and MacIntosh (2000) analyze the factors that affect the exit outcome (see also Schweinbacher, 2002), and 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2002b,c) analyze the choice of full versus partial exits for each of the five exit vehicles. 
     
11  Canadian data sources for Figure 5: www.globefunds.com, www.morningstar.ca; see note 12 for the U.S. 
data sources for Figure 5.  The data do not exhibit survivorship bias because there has not been an LSVCC that has 
been wound up (the tax benefits provided to these funds, as indicated in Table 2, pretty much guarantees capital 
inflows regardless of performance). 
     
12   The US VC Index value from Peng (2001) is not available for 2000 and 2001.  Peng’s data are from 
Venture Economics.  Venture Economics has posted on their web page (www.ventureeconomics.com) a value of 
their own index for the date 06/28/2002 (only) of 361.36 that is based over a similar horizon used by Peng.  The 
authors owe thanks to Peng for directing us to the Venture Economics cite for a recent comparable value for the US 
index.  It is noteworthy that Peng’s index calculations are more economically and statistically rigorous than that 
posted by Venture Economics.  
















Acquisitions Buybacks IPOs Mergers Writeoffs Secondary Sales  29 
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Globe LSVCC Peer Index Globe Canadian Small Cap Peer Index TSE 300 Composite Index US VC Index (Peng, 2001, Figure 7)
The Peng (2001) data stops at 1999.  The Venture Economics Post-
Venture Capital Index (PVCI) indicates an index value of 361.36 as at
 06/28/2002 (based on venture-backed companies over the past 10
years).  The Peng (2001) index is based on Venture Economics data,
but there are some differences in the index computation methods. 
                                                
MacIntosh, 2000, 2001,2002b,d), and the inferior performance of LSVCC investments relative to other 
Canadian private equity investments (Brander et al., 2002).  It is also consistent with Smith’s (1997) 
evidence that returns to the Solidarity fund, the oldest and largest LSVCC in Canada, have lagged that of 
short-term treasury bills, and Osborne and Sandler’s (1998) evidence that average LSVCC performance 
has lagged that of guaranteed investment certificates in Canada.  These results are consistent withcurrent 
theoretical work  (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2000, 2001; see also Keuschnigg, 2002, and Keuschnigg 
and Nielsen, 2001, 2002).  That LSVCCs have grossly underperformed while simultaneously attracting 
more capital than other forms of private equity (Figure 1) strongly suggests that private equity has been 
inefficiently allocated in Canada.




The Canadian LSVCC programs were launched by the federal and provincial governments with 
multiple mandates related to job creation, worker education, and promoting local investment.  However, 
the most important goal was the augmentation of the pool of venture capital in Canada.  The LSVCC, 
however, has a highly unusual structure.  While typically organized by a management or marketing 
company, a labour union must agree to act as the fund’s sponsor.  The union will usually receive either a 
fixed fee for agreeing to lend its name to the fund, or a small percentage of the net asset value of the fund.  
Despite having no other economic interest, the union is required by law to appoint a majority of the 
directors of the fund, and hence will exercise control.  The fund will contractually engage a heterogeneous 
variety of experts to perform various management functions, including portfolio investment, valuation, 
administration, and marketing. 
 
We have suggested that this structure is an invitation to high agency costs and low returns.  In 
particular, the divorcing of ownership from control is not as well mitigated by alternative governance 
devices (and the incentives of the various actors) as it is for private funds.  The available evidence 
supports the view that LSVCCs have achieved returns that are grossly inferior to alternative investments.  
This is strong evidence that LSVCC managers have lower levels of skill than their private sector 
counterparts.  Despite this, LSVCCs have achieved spectacular growth over the past decade.  The 
evidence indicates that this growth is entirely driven by the available tax subsidies.  Indeed, we note that 
 
     
13  The inefficient allocation of capital in Canada as a result of the presence of LSVCCs has been recognized 
by MacIntosh (1994, 1997), Halpern (1997), Smith (1997), Vaillancourt (1997), Osbourne and Sandler (1998), 
Cumming and MacIntosh (2000, 2001, 2002a,b,c,d), Ayayi (2002a), and others.   32 
 
very few, if any, LSVCCs market themselves on the basis of returns.  Those that do invariably market 
themselves on the basis of their after tax return. 
 
The evidence suggests that the growth of the LSVCCs has been achieved at the expense of other 
types of funds (including private funds).  Without similar tax subsidies, these other funds have higher 
required rates of return than LSVCCs.  They are thus subject to consistently being out-bid by LSVCCs for 
investment opportunities, lowering their returns and thus increasing the opportunity cost of venture capital 
investing.  The cost of crowding out is large: a significant portion of the pool of Canadian venture capital 
has, in effect, been spirited from the hands of skilled private sector managers to the hands of 
comparatively less skilled LSVCC managers.  This does not bode well for the future of the Canadian 
venture capital industry. 
 
The LSVCC programs thus appear not only to have failed to achieve their principle goal 
(expansion in the pool of venture capital); they actually appear to have been an important factor in 
frustrating the achievement of that goal.  The price tag for this failure is in the vicinity of CAN$3-4 
billion of tax expenditures.  
 
Lastly, we note that the very concept of a venture capital fund that is designed to elicit retirement 
contributions from blue-collar workers (one of founding inspirations and often a statutorily enumerated 
goal of the programs) seems fundamentally flawed.  Evidence suggests that a non-trivial number of 
contributors to LSVCC funds are unsophisticated investors with few or no other investments.  It does not 
seem particularly wise to invite such underdiversified individuals to contribute their retirement savings to 
comparatively high-risk investments such as venture capital. 
 
We suggest that the best solution to the problems summarized in this paper is simply to terminate 
the LSVCC programs.  If subsidization of venture capital is thought to be desirable, the LSVCC is not an 
efficient vehicle for achieving this end. 
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